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Abstract 
The issue of performance of internal auditors is important since Thailand was also affected by the 
accounting scandals. The expanded scope in the definition of internal auditing and new regulatory 
requirements such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 has increased the demands on internal auditing. 
This study was conducted to examine the relationship between the corporate governance on the 
performance of internal auditors in Thailand public limited companies. In this study, corporate 
governance relates to the board of directors size and audit committee size to the performance of the 
internal auditor. To achieve this objective, two hypotheses were developed based on previous studies 
and the agency theory. Survey questionnaires were sent to the Chief Audit Executives (CAEs) to 
determine the effectiveness on their performance based on the professional standards issued by the 
IPPF (2017) indicators. A total of 520 questionnaires were distributed, but only 146 were usable. 
Multiple regressions were used to test the relationship between the variables. The result showed that 
there is insignificant relationship between board of director’s size and internal auditors’ performance. 
This study however found that audit committee size has a positive relationship on the performance of 
internal auditors. Therefore, audit committee need to increase higher responsibility with regard to 
corporate governance by overseeing financial reporting and internal control matters. 
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1. Introduction 
Performance of internal auditors can be encountered with significant diversity and vagueness in their 
work. They need skills in examining activities and management practices. They can be faced with the 
need to become familiar with organizational contexts and subject matters. 
Performance auditors must have a clear understanding of the objectives, the effectiveness of operation, 
and compliance with laws, regulations and policies, audit standards and process. Performance 
measurement includes establishment of standards and indicators to which management and staff are 
held accountable. Recently, performance measurement obtained rational attention in internal auditing 
because it establishes one of the most essential managerial functions (Rupsys & Boguslauskas, 2007). 
With this basis, performance measurement evaluates to what extent the efficiency of public resources 
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being used and to what extent the effectiveness of public service outcomes are being achieved (Tudor, 
2007). 
Global business scandals have prompted the responsibilities of management and organisation 
fiduciaries in the particular subjects of governance, control and risk management, as well as brought 
about additional legislation and regulation. Since the notorious collapse of energy trader WorldCom 
and Enron, it has focused international attention on company failures (Dibra, 2016). Thus, international 
regulation plays a significant role in this process. 
The corporate collapses of Enron in the 2001 has focused on the audit profession. The corporate 
failures provoked alterations at both international and national levels to assurance and auditing 
standards, and related laws to address stakeholder concerns arising from the corporate collapses 
(KPMG, 2006). In response to this, the Stock Exchange of Thailand made a pronouncement 
promulgating new regulations of corporate governance in order to control Thailand listed companies. 
The effectiveness of corporate governance helps ensure the appropriate works the managers of the 
companies perform to protect shareholders’ rights and welfare (Gramling, Maletta, Schneider, & 
Churchet, 2004; Radu, 2012). 
Corporate governance and internal auditing have turn out to be a major public concern (Karagiorgos, 
Drogalas, Gotsamanis, & Tmpakoudis, 2010). In this concept, international guidelines recognize that 
effective corporation of internal auditing and corporate governance is a basis of competitive benefit and 
increases performance (Karagiorgos, Drogalas, Gotsamanis, & Tmpakoudis, 2010). The internal 
auditing contribution to corporate governance is portrayed via marking off the association between the 
corporate governance key elements and internal audit. In fact, the Board of Directors has been 
recognized as a main player in corporate governance, by governance committee and regulators 
worldwide (ASX, 2003; USA Congress, 2002). 
In Thailand, corporate governance has been recognized since the national financial crisis in 1997. Since 
its relevant to a firm’s value, investor confidence and the sustainable overall growth, Thai government 
has attempted to build the good corporate governance in order to strengthen Thai economy, maintain 
investor confidence and maximise the country’s level of competitiveness (Calkoen, 2012). The 
government’s national agenda has included corporate governance in 2002 under the Capital Market 
Master Plan (The SET Thailand, 2013). This plan emphasised on good corporate governance. The 
comprehensiveness and compatibility of the Principles of Corporate Governance of the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) of Thailand then were relevantly revised in 
2006 based on The World Bank recommendations (The SET Thailand, 2013). 
The role of corporate governance in internal auditing has increased a lot of attention in Thailand. The 
Stock Exchange of Thailand required that Thai listed companies must provide the adequate internal 
control and the internal auditing effectiveness and corporate governance in 1998. The purpose of the 
new standards is to improve investor confidence and improve the quality and credibility of audited 
financial reports. Therefore, auditors must to be trained in the application of the new standards to 
achieve these aims (ASIC, 2006). When the auditor has mistakenly conducted the audit and there is a 
serious distortion of the financial statements that is not shown in the audit report, audit failure arises 
(Arens, Elder, & Beasley, 2002). As long as the auditor has complied with Generally Accepted 
Auditing Standards, audit failure does not arise regardless of the accuracy and fairness of the financial 
statements (Tackett, Wolf, & Claypoo, 2004). Auditing requires that the CAEs or head of internal 
auditor must establish the strategy to fulfill the internal audit’s responsibilities by ensuing the 
implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and IIA’s International Standards for the 
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Professional Practice of Internal Auditing (IIA) (Rama, Martin, Newman, & Constance, 2002). 
The responses of governments worldwide to corporate scandals have been greater regulated. This 
response is often taken in the name of supporting the need for protecting the public’s interest. Attention 
has been focused on flaws in the capital market and reforms to corporate reporting and auditing that 
may rectify them. Stock exchanges, global and local accounting and auditing standard-setters, 
institutional investors and other stakeholders have called for transparency and accountability in 
corporate governance, business ethics and corporate reporting (Kostadimovski, Trajkovska, & 
Javanova, 2012).  
Previous research on corporate governance signifies the Board of Director’s effectiveness for ensuring 
the prosperity of the company and the important role of the board in the strategic orientation of 
corporations (Barroso, 2011).  
Hence, effectiveness of corporate governance can be assessed by internal audit. Fauver and Fuerst 
(2006) showed that employee representation in boards delivering value for high quality corporate 
operational knowledge in making decisions and provide a powerful mean to monitor and reduce agency 
costs in a company. Based on Gramling et al. (2004) and Sarens (2009) suggested that the measurement 
of IA’s effectiveness can be made once the quality of IA function “has a positive influence on the 
corporate governance quality”. 
 
2. Problem Statement 
For the past 10 years, there has been a loud call for “better” governance of organizations. This call 
began with a focus on major public companies and has expanded to cover a broad range of 
organizations (Gupta, 2016). Previous studies have revealed that the auditing profession has had to 
manage a lot of challenges such as corporate governance on the performance of internal auditors 
(Mactosh, 2010). These failures of business are not new phenomenas. Exposed cases of the recent past, 
such as WorldCom and Enron among others have drawn increasing attention to the auditing profession. 
This has cumulatively and negatively impacted how informed opinion views the auditing profession 
and financial reporting. 
The issues on accounting scandals have arised regarding auditors and accountants in general. The 
requirement for public accounting companies in all countries to meet a minimum level of competency 
was intensified by the trend toward business globalisation. The expanded scope in the internal auditing 
definition (The IIA, 2004) and new regulatory requirements such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 in 
the USA have brought about more demands on internal auditing. The IIA commissioned the 2006 
Common Body of Knowledge study in 2006. This study involved worldwide researchers “to better 
recognise the growing scope of internal audit practice” (Cooper, Leung, & Wong, 2006). 
After the experience of Asian financial crisis in Thailand in 1997, there were many corporate scandals 
such as Picnic (Thailand) limited company. These include non-compliance with business, failures, and 
misconducts such as non-compliance of business operating conduct, failure of financial document 
submission, failure to hold securities for executives and directors, and false information (Calkoen, 
2012). 
The Thailand public limited companies have debated on corporate governance issues regarding 
political, public and private reform. They lacked the capacity to deal with the challenges of 
globalisation and risks associated with an increasingly interdependent world. There also are weak 
policy responses, poor governance and lopsided development which had deepened the crisis even more 
(The Nation, 2013).  
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In the wake of the crisis, Dr. Prasarn Trairatvorakul, the Deputy Secretary-General of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) of Thailand outlined the challenges of the task to improve governance in 
a September 1999 speech. He noted that a firm’s board of directors is the main force for good corporate 
governance practices and must be held accountable for its roles. Three specific approaches to 
strengthening corporate governance practices and accountability were outlined: laws and regulations, 
institutional set-up, and market forces. The SEC designed reform efforts to mirror the corporate 
governance disciplines. Using regulatory discipline, market discipline, and self-discipline, good 
governance principles will protect investors’ rights, improve board accountability, and increase 
transparency and disclosure. Thus, organizations like the Bank of Thailand (Thailand’s central bank), 
the Ministries of Finance and Commerce, the SEC, the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), the Thai 
Institute of Directors Association (IOD), professional associations for accountants, auditors, and 
internal auditors, and investors’ associations all began to play a more direct role in creating, 
implementing, and enforcing corporate governance reforms (Limpaphayom & Connelly, 2004). 
Corporate governance reform in Thailand has been an evolution rather than a revolution 
(Limpaphayom & Connelly, 2004). Rather than sweeping away existing pre-crisis regulations, laws, 
and institutions to replace them with something completely new, corporate governance reform in 
Thailand has concentrated on improving the existing infrastructure, institutions, and enforcement. 
Substantial progress has been made to improve virtually all aspects of governance, especially the 
protection of shareholders, the effectiveness of the board, disclosure, and transparency (Limpaphayom 
& Connelly, 2004). 
The requirement that all firms provide financial statement audited by an external auditor is an 
important aspect of disclosure and transparency. Recent changes in the SET rules and guidelines are 
designed to encourage and ensure the promote independence of board members and especially of the 
audit committee. The SET established the “Best Practices Guidelines for Audit Committee” in June 
1999. The Exchange also spelled out the qualifications and scope of work of the audit committee in the 
same month. By the end of 1999, all listed companies were required to establish an audit committee, 
composed of no less than three independent directors (Limpaphayom & Connelly, 2004). 
Both national and international economists argued regarding the most effective solutions to recover 
Thailand’s imperfect infrastructure of corporate governance. The Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) 
(2002) issued the SET Code of Best Practice for Directors of Listed Companies to support a good 
corporate governance guideline. The Committee on Enhancing Efficiency and Standard Performance 
(1997) for the private and public sector have been issued to improve the standard management system 
and outcomes for Thailand. This first step aims to improve the companies operation and best practices 
in addition to good governance for Thailand’s administrative system as a whole.  
 
3. Objective of the Study 
Base on the above discussion, the objective of this study is to examine the relationship between the 
corporate governance (Board of Director size and Audit Committee size) on the performance of 
internal auditors in Thailand public limited companies. 
 
4. Significance of the Study 
This study distributes empirical evidence as to the scope of the performance of internal auditors’ 
adherence to IPPF (2017) of the Institute of Internal Audit (IIA) became effective. The IPPF is for the 
improvement of both the Professional Practice Framework (PPF) and the fundamental of the profession 
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of internal auditing. It is the outcome of careful study, deliberation, and consultation about the basic 
principles of internal auditing. 
The significance of the study can be viewed through the theoretical principals performed as auditors, 
which in many agencies; principals do not have the expertise and skills to check whether agents have 
completed their tasks. Principals need expert auditors when they encounter with the asymmetries of 
information.  
From the practical perspective, this study concerns to the extent of the internal auditors’ characteristics 
and corporate governance on the performance of internal auditors in Thailand public limited companies. 
This study could provide the measurement of how effectively public service outcome are being 
achieved and a basis for good performance audit practices. 
 
5. Corporate Governance and Performance of Internal Auditors 
Khan (2011) illustrates that corporate governance refers to the processes, customs, policies, laws and 
institutions that regulates the organizations and corporations in the way they act, administer and control 
their operations. It is required to accomplish the organization’s goals and manage the stakeholders’ 
relationship including the shareholders and board of directors. It as well works with the individuals’ 
accountability via a mechanism which decreases the principal-agent issue in the organization (Khan, 
2011). 
Corporate governance is an important component in enhancing economic growth and efficiency and 
developing confidence of the investor (OECD Principles, 2004). Corporate governance is the process 
by which shareholders, creditors and other firm stakeholders apply an impact on manager’s decisions. 
Anglo-Saxon concept of “corporate governance” refers to the system which is directing and controlling 
companies (Cadbury Committee, 1992). 
The term corporate governance was defined as the public and private institutes that govern the 
relationship between the stakeholders and the corporate managers by using regulations, laws, and the 
business practices (Khan, 2011). 
Good governance in a firm is a tool for organizational strategy and the key to performance. The 
corporate governance purposes to increase the firm performance and to harmonize the various interest 
groups (Morariu, Mitea, Stoian, & Crecana, 2009). 
In literature, the concept of corporate governance includes components of social responsibility, ethical 
business practices, issues referring to internal and external audit transparency, managers’ responsibility 
for the accuracy of information presented in financial reports (Maria, 2012). Corporate governance was 
defined by Monks and Minow (2001) as the existing correlation between numerous participants in 
finding the setting and performance of corporations. Participants refer to shareholders, management 
and the board of directors. 
Previous research indicates that corporate governance plays a vital role in an effective performance of 
internal auditors (Grambling, 2004). Grambling (2004) states that one of the four cornerstones of 
corporate governance is internal audit function. Hence, the internal auditing function of internal 
auditors has an important role in assisting the board of directors monitor the effectiveness of its 
governance. Thus, the effectiveness of internal audit helps the company to operate in accordance with 
standards and regulations by evaluating a specific controls and procedures and ensure that those 
charged with governance that internal company processes are adequate and functional. It is 
recommended that effective internal auditing in organizations requires the work to be of a high 
standard, quoting the IIA’s international standards as an example of what should be required by audit 
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committees. 
The study has a second objective which is to study the influence of corporate governance factors and 
internal auditors’ performance in Thailand Public Limited Companies. In this study, a corporate 
governance factors consists of board of director and audit committee. Corporate governance in this 
study accesses the objectives of assuring accountability and improving performance of the internal 
auditor. 
In the end, the board of directors is responsible for the entity’s achievement of objectives, which the 
internal auditor’s contribution is to distribute information to the board of directors (Colbert, 2002). 
Thus, internal audit’s role is crucial to help the board of directors in its governance self-assessment. 
The association among the internal auditor and the audit committee is important. They reciprocally 
strengthen each other’s function (Goodwin & Yeo, 2001). Audit committees are required to adopt more 
responsibility regarding corporate governance by supervising financial reporting and internal control 
matters (Myers & Ziegenfuss, 2006). 
5.1 Board of Directors and Performance of Internal Auditors 
The board of directors is considered as a significant institution in the governance of current 
corporations. With regard to the problems of corporate control, agency theory views corporate 
governance mechanisms specifically the board of directors as being a crucial monitoring tool. This 
offers an attempt to ensure that issues possibly brought about by the principal-agent relationships are 
diminished (Mallin, 2007). 
The board of directors has been known as an important player in corporate governance by governance 
committees and regulators worldwide (ASX, 2003; USA Congress, 2002). Due to the fact that the 
board of directors has responsibility for the entity’s goals accomplishment, the contribution of internal 
auditor is to deliver information to that group (Colbert, 2002). Thus, internal audit’s role is crucial in 
assisting the board of directors in its governance self-assessment. 
Due to lack of available resources in terms of time and professional knowledge, the shareholders 
delegate their managing function to the board of directors, which thereby acts as their agent and is 
subject to reporting obligations (Semler, 1995). Likewise, internal control is assigned to either the 
board of directors. Internal auditor is usually an intra-company (staff) department, which performs 
audit and advisory services for the management at all levels of the company. Through the provision of 
effective support to the management in the framework of bonding and monitoring, performance of 
internal auditors constitutes an important element of the company’s internal corporate governance 
(Freidank & Pasternack, 2011; Sarens & Abdolmohammadi, 2011). 
The growing interest in the effect of board of directors’ characteristics is because of the board’s roles in 
providing connection to other resource dependencies (Balta, 2008; Bathula, 2008). Many research have 
tried to recognize the boards of directors’ attributes or mechanisms that lead to better corporate 
performance and strategic decision-making (Maharaj, 2009). 
5.1.1 Board of Director Size and Performance of Internal Auditors 
The size of board differs from organization to organization. This depends on several factors such as the 
type, size, the board culture and its work nature. Every organization is diverse and ideal board size may 
not be suggested as a norm. The organization to function effectively requires a board that is small in 
size where every board member has a significant role to play and also need a board which is large 
enough so that the work of the board is done with diversity of experiences. 
Board of director size is considered as an important characteristic that affects the effectiveness of the 
board in monitoring management. The organization to function effectively requires a board that is 
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small in size. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) argued the possibility that larger boards can be less 
effective than small boards. When boards consist of too many members agency problems may increase. 
Wu (2000) finds that board size diminished on average over this period and that the decline can be 
clarified at least partly by pressure from active investors such as California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System (CalPERS). Coles (2008) exhibit that board size is regulated by firm specific 
variables, such as firm size, Tobin’s Q and profitability. Preceding researches have been seriously 
criticised for not sufficiently controlling for endogeneity problems because firm performance has an 
undesirable influence on board size (Wintoki, 2007). 
5.2 Audit Committee and Performance of Internal Auditors 
Audit Committee (AC) assists as a communication link for the relationship between external and 
internal auditors and the board of directors. Their activities consist of reviewing general scope of the 
audit, reviewing of nominateauditors, the audit results, internal financial controls, and publication 
financial information. Certainly, the existence of company audit committee would offer a serious 
oversight of the company’s auditing and financial reporting processes (Walker, 2004). 
DeZoort et al. (2002) state that the effective oversight tends to have limited achievement due to the fact 
that audit committees have insufficient knowledge of the organization’s operations, deal with “complex 
but inadequate second-hand information” and meet infrequently. DeZoort et al. (2002) defines an 
effective AC as follows: “An effective AC had eligible members with the ability and resources to care 
for stakeholder benefits by ensuring consistent financial reporting, risk management and internal 
controls through its industrious oversight efforts”. Nevertheless, various factors moving the 
performance of AC need to be addressed in order to optimise their effectiveness and achieve their 
objectives. 
In recent years, ACs has taken a significant governance role in overseeing and coordinating the 
communications between external auditor, management, and internal auditors. AC is a subcommittee 
under corporate governance framework to which the board delegates some of its oversight 
responsibilities. 
Gramling (2004) emphasised that “a value relationship between the AC and the Internal Audit Function 
(IAF) also works towards giving the IAF with a proper environment and support system for completing 
its own governance related activities”. In addition, corporate governance guidelines and listing rules 
obviously identify the governance role played by ACs in improving the relationship between 
management, internal auditors and external auditors (Smith, 2003; Blue Ribbon Committee, 1999). As 
such, ACs can be seen as a key protection mechanism for internal auditors in managing their skilled 
objectivity. 
5.2.1 Audit Committee Size and Performance of Internal Auditors 
AC size is a critical determinant of AC effectiveness. Vafeas (2007) discovered a positive relationship 
between AC size and performance of internal auditors. This result demonstrates that the performance of 
internal auditors increase as the size of the AC increases. 
DeZoort et al. (2002) propose that AC size measured as the number of AC members has a positive 
influence on performance. Therefore, it is likely that ACs with a sufficient number of members have 
preferred resource over smaller ACs. 
Pucheta-Martinez and Fuentes (2007) documented positive relationship between size of AC and 
performance based of the quality of financial reporting. A large AC may not necessarily bring about 
more effective functioning as more members in an AC may lead to unnecessary debates and delay the 
decision, even though AC size is influenced by the size of the company and the board of directors (Lin, 
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Xiao, & Tang, 2008). 
 
6. Agency Theory 
Agency theory argues that internal auditing provides assistance in maintaining cost efficient agreement 
between managers and owners. Hence, internal auditing is similar to other intervention mechanisms 
such as external audit and financial reporting (Saren, 2007). 
Adams (1994) states that agency theory provides support in clarifying the companies’ existence of 
internal auditing. However, it can as well assist in providing a significant explanation of the internal 
auditor’ characteristic with the performance of internal auditors. 
Agency theory recognises board of director and audit committee monitoring roles as playing a key role 
in mitigation agent-principle conflict. Monks and Minow (2003) state that boards are the link between 
the people who provide capital (the shareholders) and the people who use that capital to create value 
(the managers). Thus, this study focuses on the internal audit function of Thailand public limited 
company in response to the pressure from supervisory agencies. Their impacts on performance of 
internal auditors are also evaluated through agency theory recently proposed. 
Moreover, this study purposed agency theory to clarify the internal audit existence, the nature of the 
internal audit function and the specific approach adopted by internal auditors to their work. It can also 
forecast how the internal audit function tends to be influenced by the internal auditors’ characteristics 
and corporate governance of the company. Thus, agency theory offers a foundation for invaluable 
research. This can be beneficial to both the profession of internal auditing and the academic 
community. 
It is clear that audits serve a fundamental purpose in promoting confidence and trust in certain financial 
information in financial statements. The principal-agent conflict as depicted through agency theory is 
of particular importance in this respect and sheds light on the development of the internal audit in 
Thailand over the centuries. Concern about trust and the reliability of financial information helps to 
explain why the internal audit is seen as an important mechanism for shareholders to help ensure that 
the directors are running the company in the shareholders’ best interests. 
 
7. Research Framework 
The independent variable of this study is the corporate governance (board of director size and audit 
committee size). The performance of internal auditors is the dependent variable. They are discussed in 
the following sections. The research study’s framework is shown in Figure 1. 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable 
 
 
Figure 1. Research Framework 
 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between relationship between corporate governance (board of director 
size and audit committee size) and performance of internal auditors. It shows how corporate 
governance could be influence by the performance of internal auditors, which relates to the ability to 
access the objectives of assuring accountability. 
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The proposed model is based on the assumption of the agency theory. Agency theory is beneficial as an 
economic theory of accountability. It offers assistance in explaining the development of the audit. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) states the agency theory assumes that a firm contains a link of contracts 
connecting the owners of cost-effective resources (the principals) and managers (the agents) who are 
charged with using and controlling those resources. 
Additionally, agency theory offers a theoretical framework that is beneficial for the research in the 
function of internal auditing. Purposes of the agency theory explain and forecast the internal audit 
existence. It explains the responsibilities and roles given to internal auditors by the organization and 
forecast how the function of internal audit is possibly be affected by organizational change.  
The agency theory stated that the board of directors and audit committee might mitigate agency 
problems leading to reduced agency cost by aligning the interests of controlling owners with those of 
the company. This study can be interpreted in these mechanisms as practices or regulations resulting 
from coercion by legislators who impose certain practices in order to improve organizational 
effectiveness. Lee (2009) suggested that the context of corporate governance is under the agency 
theory. 
 
8. Hypotheses Development 
The research hypotheses address the corporate governance related to factors of (i) Board of Director, 
and (ii) Audit committee as an independent variable. The performance of internal auditors is the 
dependent variable. The independent variable factors may have impacts on the performance of internal 
auditors. 
The board of directors is the highest-level of the mechanisms in the organization since they possess the 
ultimate power to compensate the decisions that are made through the top management. Board size is 
believed to be the basic aspect of effective decision making. Vafeas (2005) suggested that the board 
size and its performance had a non-linear relationship. Both too small and too large of the board size is 
likely to make it ineffective. Previous studies have shown that small boards are more effective because 
the directors can communicate better among them, as well as easy to manage (Vafeas, 2005; Xie, 
Davidson, & Dadalt, 2003). 
The size of the board is also considered as an important characteristic. This characteristic affects how 
effective the board monitors the management. The greater the number of the board members, the more 
the management’s monitoring activity (Loderer & Peyer, 2002). Coles (2008) found that the firm board 
size is positive for large firms. Therefore, an ideal value maximizing outcome for those firms may 
come from large board size. 
Adams and Mehran (2005) found a positive relationship between board size and performance 
(measured by Tobin’s Q) in the U.S banking industry. 
While, Chan and Li (2008), Moustafa (2006), Ahmadu (2005) and De Andres (2005) found that larger 
boards are associated with poorer performance. Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, and Zimmermann (2004), 
Limpaphayom and Connelly (2006) and Bhagat and Black (2002) found no significant relationship 
between firm performance and board size, the following hypothesis can be empirically tested. 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between the Board of Director (board size) and the 
performance of internal auditors. 
Starting with the 1999 Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit 
Committees (BRC), more formalised methods were taken to improve and issue explicit suggestions that 
audit committees could report to improve their effectiveness (Myers & Ziegenfuss, 2006). It is 
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necessary for the audit committees to take more responsibility in regards to corporate governance. This 
can be done by supervising the matters on internal control and financial reporting. Moreover, Goh’s 
(2009) research suggested that the internal control problems are more likely to be solved in a will-time 
manner when the audit committee’s quality regarding its independence, size, and expertise is higher. 
It appears that the audit committee size is one of the significant characteristics that contribute to its 
effectiveness. If the audit committee size is too small then an insufficient number of directors to serve 
the committee occurred and thus decrease its monitoring effectiveness (Vafeas, 2005). On the other 
hand, when a committee size is too large, the directors’ performance may decline because of the 
coordination and process problems and hence, highlight another reason for weak monitoring (Vafeas, 
2005). The perfect average of the audit committee size is between 3 and 4 members (Vafeas, 2005; 
Abbott, Parker, & Peters, 2004; Xie et al., 2003). Therefore, evidence from the previous suggested that 
firms with large audit committee are more effective in monitoring the management. 
Pucheta-Martinez and Fuentes (2007) discovered that the size of audit committee and ratio of 
independent member affect the possibility that firms received appropriate audit report due to error or 
non-compliance qualification. 
A statistical finding illustrated that the relationship between the audit committee size of fraud and 
non-fraud firms showed no significant difference (Farber, 2005). The relationship of audit committee 
size with earnings management (Bedard, 2004; Xie, 2003) and audit the interim financial disclosure 
level was also found insignificant (Mangena & Pike, 2005). 
From the discussion above, the following is the hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between the audit committee (size) and the performance 
of internal auditors. 
 
9. Result 
The questionnaires are delivered to the Chief Audit Executives (CAEs) or the Head of Internal 
Auditing Department in Thailand public limited companies. Of the 520 questionnaires administered, 
475 respondents were contacted. However, only 146 responses were obtained originating a response 
rate of 30.74%. 45 surveys were undelivered because either the firms had relocated the corporate 
offices to other buildings or absence of in-house internal audit functions since the firms had outsourced 
its internal auditing function to the accounting or external audit firms. 
 
Table 1. Regression Coefficient 
Model 
Coefficientsa 
t Sig. Unstandardised Coefficients Standardised Coefficients 
B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) 3.126 1.391  2.247 .026 
BOD -.083 .058 -.148 -1.413 .160 
Audit committee .098 .048 .212 2.037 .044* 
Note. a) Dependent Variable: performance of internal auditors.  
b) at 0.01 significant level. 
 
Table 1 displayed that the coefficient of board of director is -.148, which is also significant at 0.01 
probability level (Beta=-.148, Sig. F=.160that is p>0.01). An increase in the board of director is 
expected a change of -.148 on the dependent variable, which is the performance of internal auditors 
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since the Beta sign is negative. An examination of the t-values (t=-1.413, p>0.01) indicates that board 
of director do not contribute to the improvement of the performance of internal auditors. This suggests 
that board of director size is significant to the performance of internal auditors. Hence, hypothesis 1 is 
rejected. 
Table 1 also displayed that the coefficient of audit committee is .212, which is also significant at 0.01 
probability level (Beta=.212, Sig. F=.044 that is p<0.01). An increase in the audit committee is 
expected a change of 0.212 on the dependent variable, which is the performance of internal auditors 
since the Beta sign is positive. An examination of the t-values (t=2.037, p<0.01) shows that audit 
committee is stronger contributes to the improvement of the performance of internal auditors. This 
suggests that audit committee is significant to the performance of internal auditors. Therefore, 
hypothesis 2 is accepted. 
 
10. Discussion 
Based on the results, the board of director size relationship on the performance of internal auditors is not 
statistically significant. This is in line with previous literature such as Beiner et al. (2004), 
Limpaphayom and Connelly (2006) which suggests that the internal auditor’s performance has no 
significant relationship between board size and performance of internal auditors. Hence, Thailand 
public limited companies board of directors’ size has the optimal number of directors on their board. 
However, Thailand public limited companies need to ensure that the board of director and internal 
auditors comply with the laws, the regulations of the SET and the relevant laws to the Company’s 
businesses. 
On the other hand, the result shows that the audit committee size is statistically significant. The study 
also found evidences such as Vafeas (2007) and Pucheta-Martinez and Fuentes (2007) that support the 
positive relationship between audit committee size and performance of internal auditors. Therefore, the 
Thailand public limited companies audit committee need to increase higher responsibility with regard 
to corporate governance by overseeing the effectiveness of performance of internal auditors such as 
financial reporting and internal control matters. 
 
11. Limitations of the Study 
This study offers obvious evidence that the internal auditors’ performance adheres to the IPPF (2017) 
of the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) for Thailand public limited companies. Hence, the limitations 
of the present study provide further research opportunities. The survey of CAEs in Thailand public 
limited companies is used as basis of this study, and the findings would benefit for internal auditors. 
Yet, this study has its limitations since only 146 public limited companies are incorporated in this 
study. 
This study assumed that the corporate governance in relation to the performance of internal auditors 
provide measurement of how effectively public service outcome are being achieved and a basis for 
good performance audit practices. 
 
12. Conclusion 
The effectiveness of internal auditor’s performance is based on the professional standards issued by the 
IPPF (2017). Thus, performance standard is a standard that describes the nature and internal audit 
activities.   
Based on the result, board of director size is not significant to the performance of internal auditors in 
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Thailand public limited companies. However, the result shows that the audit committee size is 
statistically significant to the performance of internal auditors. 
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